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ABSTRACT
This study provides a cross-country comparative analysis of China’s development 
finance policies and foreign policy practices to identify patterns of conduct within 
the sector and across regions as well as of differences in this conduct. Using both 
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I. INTRODUCTION
China’s position in the Global South as a leading source of development finance and a key provider of infrastructure has made it a major player, and even geopolitical force in a relatively short time. Among the chief causes of this transformation is the pre-eminent role of its policy banks—especially China 
ExIm Bank and China Development Bank—in lending to governments needing project funding but finding it 
difficult to secure from multilateral sources. Also involved is a range of Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) as well as some private firms operating as implementing agents for the infrastructure sector. In order 
to understand China’s rapid advances as well as the obstacles and setbacks it has experienced overseas, 
more insight is needed into how its development sector conducts business across a variety of regions and 
regulatory environments.
This paper will undertake a cross-country comparative analysis of China’s development finance policies 
and contract implementation practices to identify patterns of conduct within the sector and across regions 
as well as of differences in this conduct. Using both primary and secondary sources, we analyze Chinese 
development finance, SOEs and private firms in Costa Rica, Argentina, Malaysia, and Djibouti. This is followed 
by a comparative assessment of these cases to conclude whether or not there are relevant commonalities 
and/or case-specific features in these examples.
II. COSTA RICA
We start this study with Costa Rica because of the strategi importance China is giving to the region of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. China’s trade with LAC mushroomed beginning in the early 2000s. Today China 
is the first or second largest trading partner of most of the region’s countries, making the overall relationship, 
both trade and nontrade, unexpectedly more important in world affairs. Costa Rica has been part of this story 
(Argentina as well, see below).1
Costa Rica did not establish diplomatic relations with the PRC until 1 June 2007, when former President 
Oscar Arias took the bold decision to switch from Taipei to Beijing.  Soon afterwards, Beijing subsidized the 
Costa Rican government in constructing a sports stadium (just as it had done in Djibouti approximately 30 
years earlier)  and committed itself to buying US$300 million worth of Costa Rican bonds.2 In addition, in 
2013 Beijing offered a US$1.5 billion loan to expand refinery capacity on Costa Rica’s east coast to handle 
Venezuelan oil (China being one of its largest customers), and also built a highway from the interior to a port 
on the Pacific coast. The sustained protests of local communities worried about the environmental impact of 
the refinery finally caused the government to shelve the idea of  investing in this sector.3
The story of the negotiations between Beijing and San Jose is very informative and we narrate some of 
it here. Most observers assume that this was a move initiated by China; the fact is that Arias took the very 
important initiative of approaching Beijing even before being elected President of Costa Rica in early 2006. 
He had been President before, between 1986 and 1990, which is when he obtained international accolades for 
brokering a major peace agreement across Central America in August 1987. His efforts put an end to decades 
of violent conflict in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Soon afterwards, Arias won the Nobel 
Peace Prize for his pivotal role in making this peace agreement a reality.4 
1 Alvaro Mendez, “Dependency in the Twenty-First Century? The Political Economy of China–Latin America Relations,” The China 
Journal 85 (2021): Review Article. doi:10.1086/711517
2 Gaston Fornes and Alvaro Mendez, The China-Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and their Role in an Increasingly Globalised 
World, 2 ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
3 Ibid.
4 Phillip Travis, “Oscar Arias and the Treaty of Esquipulas,”  Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History (2017).
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In 2005, while running for office the second time, Arias conceived the idea of approaching the PRC in case 
he won the following year. He ran the idea by his friend and political ally Bruno Stagno, who at the time was 
Costa Rica’s Ambassador to the UN. Stagno was very supportive of the idea, but knew that approaching the 
PRC would be tricky, as it could antagonized Taipei which was an important diplomatic partner of San Jose. 
Stagno, however, had established excellent connections with various Chinese diplomats in his role as 
Ambassador and was ready to help in case Arias won.  In February 2006 Arias was indeed elected President 
for the second time, and soon afterwards appointed Stagno as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Even before being 
sworn in, Arias together with Stagno set in motion their plan, approaching Beijing in an unofficial capacity, as 
they could not do anything official until taking office in May 2006.5 
Stagno flipped through his rolodex and approached Chinese diplomats in New York in order to test the 
waters before taking any further steps. Not surprisingly, the Chinese were keen on exploring the possibility of 
diplomatic ties with Costa Rica. This was seen in Beijing as a ‘win-win’ deal. On the one hand, it would denude 
Taiwan of one more diplomatic ally; on the other hand, it would establish diplomatic ties with a country headed 
by a former Nobel Peace Prize recipient, a soft power coup in Chinese eyes. 
Soon afterwards secret negotiations were arranged in New York, Beijing and Mexico City. The negotiations 
were at a very high level and included a secret trip to Beijing by Arias and Stagno before they took office 
in May 2006. This remarkable trip passed unnoticed by observers and became a key piece in laying the 
foundation of future diplomatic relations. Once in office, Stagno continued negotiations in Mexico City with 
the utmost secrecy to avoid alarming Taipei too soon. This was necessary because Costa Rica had a number 
of agreements and projects with Taipei, some of which were being substantially funded.6 In addition, many 
domestic actors of the “Taiwan Lobby” were working hard to keep it going with Taipei, including high-ranking 
official and business elites. Stagno and Arias had always believed that Taiwan was a cause of massive local 
corruption, precisely to keep it going diplomatically.7
To cut a long story short, the negotiations were long and hard; difficult for Costa Rica for the above-
mentioned reasons and difficult because China was choosing carefully how to approach the issue. It 
is sometimes assumed that China has to work to convert conservative policy makers in traditional Latin 
American states to abandon Taipei, but in reality, this is a two-way process that has to be analyzed country-
by-country. While Beijing was open to negotiating with Costa Rica, in other cases it has not been so open. For 
instance, in the case of the Dominican Republic, who switched diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing in late 
2018, it took years to materialize. According to ex-President of the Dominican Republic Leonel Fernandez, 
who did the switch to the PRC in 2018, it took them several years to convince the PRC to agree, and it was 
not easy.8 Panama also tried for years to convince Beijing to open the door to them, but they steadfastly 
refused Panama and several other nations to avoid precipitating a diplomatic crisis by stripping Taipei of all 
international personhood.9 Panama was finally let in for geostrategic reasons, yet the Financial Times called 
it a “diplomatic victory for China”.10 
5 “Interview by one of the Authors with former President of Costa Rica - Oscar Arias (1986-1990 & 2006-2010) and Nobel Peace  
Prize Laureate (1987).”  (San Jose, Costa Rica 2017).
6 After receiving the news of Costa Rica’s decision to switch from Taipei to Beijing, the Taiwanese were furious and initiated a 
diplomatic campaign in August 2007. This included visits by President Chen to Costa Rica’s neighbors El Salvador, Nicaragua and 
Honduras, see: Alvaro Mendez, “Geopolitics in Central America: China and El Salvador in the 21st Century,” in China-Latin America 
and the Caribbean: Assessment and Outlook, ed. Thierry Kellner and Sophie Wintgens (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2021).
7 “Interview by Authors with Bruno Stagno - Former Foreign Minister of Costa Rica (2006-2010),”  (San Jose, Costa Rica 3 May 
2018).
8 “Interview by the Authors with former President of the Dominican Republic - Leonel Fernandez (1996-2000;  
2004-2008),”  (London, UK 2016).
9 Fornes and Mendez, The China-Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and their Role in an Increasingly  
Globalised World.
10 Ben Bland, “Diplomatic victory for China as Panama ditches Taiwan,”  Financial Times (2017),  
https://www.ft.com/content/9869ef7a-4fe7-11e7-bfb8-997009366969.
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Costa Rica is an exceptional country, the only one in Latin American counted amongst the world’s 22 
oldest democracies.11 It was ranked third in the world, and first in the Americas, in the 2010 Environmental 
Performance Index.12 The traditional agricultural exports of bananas, coffee, sugar, and beef are still the 
backbone of the commodity export trade. More recently, high value-added goods and services, including 
microchips, have entered the mix.13 Costa Rica is well-known for tourism with its mega-biodiversity, which 
makes it a favorite destination for ecotourists. Costa Rica has also attracted one of the highest per capita 
rates of FDI in Latin America.14 After establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC, it became the third Latin 
American country to sign an FTA with China. That was the last one (so far) that China has signed with a Latin 
American country. It entered into force in 2011. “Over 90 percent of goods trade between China and Costa 
Rica enjoy a zero tariff on a stage-by-stage basis”15 (MOFCOM, 2011).
Costa Rican exports to China are mostly raw materials, then capital goods. Nevertheless, a significant 
proportion of its exports to China (more than a quarter) is, exceptionally for a Latin American country, 
machinery and electronic goods. China exports the same kind of goods back, but mostly consumer and 
capital goods.16 Development lending has followed diplomatic recognition. In 2015 China lent US$395 million 
for construction of the San José to Limón Highway. That was after the US$100 million lent in 2013 to finance 
clean technologies like electricity, gas or hybrid-fueled in public transport, and the US$92.36 million for the 
Chucás Hydroelectric Project in San José built by the Chinese state-owned Sinohydro in 2010.17 These are big 
projects for a country as small as Costa Rica.18
III. ARGENTINA
Argentina established diplomatic relations with the PRC on 19 February 1972.19 The pendulum swings 
in the Argentina-China relationship may be said to track political shifts in Argentina, from Peronists to neo-
liberals. Peronist politicians on the center-left found in China a partner with deep financial pockets, an appetite 
for risk—or certainly one which ignored the Western financial markets consensus on Argentine economic 
woes—and a proven capacity to build big infrastructure projects that answered both to Argentina’s grandiose 
development ambitions and to its will to decouple from US dominance. For the neo-liberal proponents on the 
center-right, China’s ideological predilections and the lack of transparency in loans and its suspect intentions 
toward Argentina, contributed to a residual hostility towards Beijing even when circumstances obliged them 
to deeper commercial engagement. 
Motives of nationalism, necessity, and profit applied to Argentina-China ties produced multi-billion-
dollar loan packages for two major dams, two nuclear power plants, an expansion of the production of 
Argentine soya bean and other agricultural exports to meet Chinese demand, not to mention investment 
in the commodity sector, especially lithium. It also heated up domestic debates about debt exposure and 
growing dependency on China; the disruptive effect of Chinese imports on local businesses; Chinese FDI in 
landed property; and the systematic exploitation of Argentina’s coastal marine riches by China’s fishing fleets. 
11 Robert A. Dahl, How Democratic Is the American Constitution? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).
12 EPI, “2010 Environmental Performance Index - Summary for Policy Makers,”   
http://epi.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2010_epi_summary_for_policymakers.pdf.
13 Enrique R. Garcia and Alvaro Mendez, “Mañana Today: A Long View of Economic Value Creation in Latin America,” Global Policy  
(2021).
14 CIA, “The World Factbook - Costa Rica,”  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cs.html.
15 MOFCOM, “China-Costa Rica FTA entered into force on August 1,” news release, 2011,  
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/encosta/encostanews/201108/7440_1.html.
16 World Bank, “Costa Rica Product exports and imports from China 2015,”  World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) (2017), http://
wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CRI/Year/2015/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/CHN/Product/all-groups.
17 Fornes and Mendez, The China-Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and their Role in an Increasingly  
Globalised World.
18 Mendez, “Geopolitics in Central America: China and El Salvador in the 21st Century.”
19 Colin Mackerras, The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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Despite the divergence between these two political trends, commonalities abided which gave continuity to 
the Latin American country’s relationship with the Asian giant.
Argentina is the second largest country in South America after Brazil in terms of GDP. It is a federal 
republic of 23 provinces plus the autonomous City of Buenos Aires, the capital. It is the eighth-largest country 
in the world by land area and the largest among Spanish-speaking nations. It has the third-largest Latin 
American economy after Brazil and Mexico, and one of the highest human development indices and GDPs 
per capita in the region, along with a well-educated labor force.20 It enjoyed a sustained period of growth and 
development from 1880 to the end of World War II, when it stood as the world’s sixth largest economy.21 Since 
then, Argentina has become mired in a cycle of political and economic conjunctures, including a war with the 
UK over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) in 1982. Due to this uneven history, commentators have given 
the country the pejorative nickname: The Superpower-that-never-was.22 In 2010 the country’s growth stood 
at more than 10%; but since then, it has declined and stagnated. GDP growth for 2016 was −2.2%.23 Argentina 
is the world’s third-largest producer of soybeans after the USA and Brazil.24 After establishing diplomatic ties 
with Argentina, China agreed to recognize Argentina’s sovereignty over the Malvinas (Falkland Islands)25  
(Calvo, 2015). Argentina recognized China as having a market economy in 2004.26 Argentina has signed 
more than 150 agreements with the PRC on subjects ranging from football to nuclear energy,27 including a 
1985 agreement on the pacific use of nuclear energy, a 1992 investment treaty, a 2013 extradition treaty; and 
one elevating their relationship to an “Integral Strategic Association” in 2014. Nearly all Argentina’s exports to 
China are vegetable products, reflecting the scale of Argentine soya production for consumption in China.28 
China exports to Argentina mostly capital goods, machinery and electronics.29 The latest quasi-agreement 
is Argentina’s 2021 membership of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is not officially a 
Chinese entity, but it is described as “China’s World Bank”.30
Foreign direct investment from China totaled US$1.655 billion between 2010 and 2015, and US$208 million 
in 2015 alone.31 As at 2014, Chinese development banks had made a total of US$15.3 billion worth of loans 
to Argentina, mostly in infrastructure and energy.32 Intriguingly, China nursed Argentina through its sovereign 
debt default crisis in 2014 through central bank currency swaps worth US$1.3 billion as part of a loan of 
20 Fornes and Mendez, The China-Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and their Role in an Increasingly Globalised World.
21 Daniel K. Lewis, The History of Argentina, 1st Palgrave Macmillan ed. ed. (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 2015).
22 Alan Beattie, “Argentina: the superpower that never was,” Financial Times, 23 May 2009; M. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of 
Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990).
23 World Bank, “Argentina: GDP growth (annual %),” in DataBank (World Bank, 2017).
24 Caroline Bain, Guide to commodities: Producers, players and prices, markets, consumers and trends, ed. The Economist (London: 
Wiley, 2013).
25 Alex Calvo, “China and the Falklands,”  The Online Journal of the China Policy Institute (2015),  
https://cpianalysis.org/2015/10/29/china-and-the-falklands.
26 FMPRC, “The Argentine Government Recognizes China’s Market Economy Status,”  (2004),  
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/ldmzs_664952/gjlb_664956/3453_664968/3454_664970/
t170557.shtml.
27 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto de la República Argentina, “Biblioteca Digital de Tratados,”   
http://tratados.mrecic.gov.ar/busqueda.php?consulta=si&modo=c.
28 Alvaro Mendez and Mariano Turzi, The Political Economy of China–Latin America Relations: The AIIB Membership (New York: 
Palgrave Pivot, 2020).
29 WITS, “Argentina Product exports and imports from China 2015,” in World Integrated Trade Solution (Washington, DC: World Bank, 
2015).
30 AIIB, “Members and Prospective Members of the Bank,” Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,  
https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html. For more on the negotiations, see:Alvaro Mendez, 
“Latin America and the AIIB: Interests and Viewpoints,” Global Policy 10, no. 4 (2019); Mendez and Turzi, The Political Economy.
31 Red ALC-China, “OFDI de China en America Latina y el Caribe 2007-2015,” in El Monitor de la OFDI de China en ALC (Mexico: 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), 2017).
32 Fornes and Mendez, The China-Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and their Role in an Increasingly Globalised World.. 
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US$11 billion total (not included in the above figures). “Under terms of the loan agreement, Argentina can 
either use the funds to bolster its reserves or pay for Chinese imports with the yuan currency.”33
Argentina’s economic problems, especially its disqualification to borrow on the international capital 
markets or from the IMF, drove the Kirchner government to turn to China in 2016. Among Argentina and 
China’s biggest joint infrastructure projects and corresponding bilateral loan portfolios are hydro-electric 
dams.  A US$4.73 billion syndicated loan package involving China Development Bank, Peoples Bank of China, 
and ICBC was agreed in 2013 by Cristina de Fernandez’s government to permit the Gezhouba Group to lead 
a consortium that included Argentine partners to build two dams on the Santa Cruz River.34 Tapping into this 
source of energy will provide 5 percent of the country’s electricity needs while reducing its annual carbon 
emissions by 2.5 percent.35 Environmental activists critical of the opaque Environmental Impact Assessment 
brought a lawsuit before the Argentine Supreme Court, resulting in the dam construction coming to a 
temporary halt in 2015. The Court’s ruling at the end of December 2016 mandated a review process that was 
to include other affected provinces and the national legislature. 
IV. MALAYSIA
Malaysia established diplomatic ties with China on 31 May 1974 after protracted negotiations between 
Kuala Lumpur and Beijing.36 Despite humble beginnings, Malaysia had the strategic advantage of being one 
of ASEAN’s five founding members in 1967.37 Malaysia’s remarkable rise from poverty to middle-income 
developing status in two decades has been attributed to the policies of former Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohammed and his governing coalition party, Bahrisan Nasional, dominated by the United Malays’ National 
Organisation (UMNO).38 Of particular note was Mahathir’s skill in mobilizing internal capital and external 
resources—development assistance, foreign direct investment, even security provisions—in the service of 
Malaysian development ambitions.39  But the acts of his successor Najib Razak, in particular blatant corruption 
involving Saudi finances and Chinese mega-projects, threw the country into crisis and brought Mahathir back 
into national politics.
PM Razak had undertaken an ambitious development program to expand the national transport system into 
underserved areas of the country and to improve energy infrastructure utilizing the opportunities presented by 
the BRI.40 In 2016, discussions with Chinese officials culminated in a US$13.1 billion loan to build a standard-
gauge, two-track railway along the neglected east coast of peninsular Malaysia to the prosperous western 
environ and a gas pipeline on the island of Sabah.41 The China Communications Construction Company 
(CCCC) won the contract for the East Coast Rail Link and began construction in August 2017. A Malaysian 
company was assigned to manage all of the operating and maintenance tasks. The pipeline contract, backed 
33 Jorge Otaola and Richard Lough, “UPDATE 1-Argentina receives second currency swap from China,” Reuters, November 17, 2014 
2014.
34 Aprovechamientos hidroeléctricos del río Santa Cruz—IEASA; Andres Napoli and Maria Marta de Paola ‘Argentina suspends 
Patagonia dams’, Dialogo China 20 January 2017, Argentina suspends Patagonia dams (dialogochino.net)
35  IEASA Aprovechamientos hidroeléctricos del río Santa Cruz—IEASA
36 Kazuyuki Katayama, China’s rise and Japan’s Malaysia policy (Magnolia Publishing Company, 2013).
37 T. Koh, S.L. Seah, and L.L. Chang, 50 Years Of Asean And Singapore (World Scientific Publishing Company, 2017).
38 Walid Jumblatt Abdullah, “The Mahathir effect in Malaysia’s 2018 election: the role of credible personalities in regime transitions,” 
Democratization 26, no. 3 (2019); Edmund Terence Gomez, Chinese business in Malaysia : accumulation, ascendance, 
accommodation (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999).
39 Yasuyuki Sawada and Iroyuki Yamada (2003) ‘Japan’s ODA and Poverty Reduction: a cross-donor comparison and a case study of 
Malaysia’, in Hiroshisa Kohama, ed., External Factors for Asian Development (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 
47-69.
40 Hong Liu and Guanie Lim, “The Political Economy of a Rising China in Southeast Asia: Malaysia’s Response to the Belt and Road 
Initiative,” The Journal of contemporary China 28, no. 116 (2019).
41 ‘Malaysia seizes China Petroleum Pipeline’s RM1b funds’, Malaysian Reserve, 15 July 2019, Malaysia seizes China Petroleum 
Pipeline’s RM1b funds (themalaysianreserve.com)
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by a US$2.5 billion loan from China ExIm Bank, was won by the China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau (CPPB), a 
subsidiary of the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). The project was to construct 
a 600-kilometer petroleum pipeline on the west coast of peninsular Malaysia and a 662-kilometer gas 
pipeline in Malaysia’s State of Sabah on Borneo Island. Finally, the state invested in a major development and 
transport hub, Bandar Malaysia, in the heart of the capital, Kuala Lumpur.42 Spillovers from Beijing’s economic 
statecraft to other areas even included military cooperation with joint exercises in the Straits of Malacca.43
The battery of Chinese loans for large-scale infrastructure projects negotiated by the Razak government 
had by 2018 pushed his country’s total external indebtedness to US$250 billion.44 Charges of massive 
corruption stemmed from these and other loans; for example, only 15% of the pipeline had actually been built 
after Malaysia had already paid 88% of the US$2.5 billion loan for it. The growing concern that Malaysia’s 
inability to repay might jeopardizing any development gains otherwise accruing from these projects began to 
firm up opposition, eventuating in the 92-year-old Mahathir’s coming out of retirement to campaign against 
Razak, who was already under severe criticism for channeling Saudi money into a state fund, 1MDB, which 
had transferred millions of dollars to his personal bank account.45 
Exacerbating the sentiment against Razak was the construction projects’ use of Chinese labor and 
supplies, plus a massive housing complex jointly developed and funded by private Chinese firms in the 
electorally crucial state of Johor, 70% of which had reportedly been bought up by foreign Chinese retirees.46 
Mahathir fashioned his electoral appeal not only on his past record but also on anti-Chinese sentiment arising 
from such incidents, which won the critical support of ethnic Malay voters.47 In a hard-fought campaign, 
Razak and Bahrisan Nasional were ousted by Pakatan Harapan, a coalition of opposition parties, in the May 
2018 elections. 
The new government led by Mahathir immediately cancelled all construction projects financed by China 
pending a forensic audit. The new Economy Minister, Mohamed Azmin Ali, noting that the annual interest 
payments alone amounted to US$120 million, declared, “We cannot afford to bear this, so this project needs 
to be terminated without affecting our good relationship with China.”48 The contracts were terminated and 
negotiations between Kuala Lumpur and Beijing reopened.49 This revealed that the deal struck between 
Malaysia and China included a “termination clause” that would cost Malaysians a hefty US$5.3 billion if the 
East Coast Rail Link project was terminated.50 
Mahathir’s vow to renegotiate the “unequal treaties” with China—a historical reference to the treaties that 
followed on Western states’ forcibly opening trade with Imperial China in the 19th century—set the tone for 
a contentious exchange.51 Nevertheless, incendiary rhetoric and the egregious terms of the loans aside, the 
Prime Minister had to rationalize reversing his initial outright cancellation of the projects, which he explained 
42 Liu and Lim, “The Political Economy of a Rising China in Southeast Asia: Malaysia’s Response to the Belt and Road Initiative.”.
43 Ngeow Chow-Bing ‘Malaysia-China defence ties cool amid political changes and South China Sea tensions’, South China Morning 
Post 4 May 2021: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3132122/malaysia-china-defence-ties-cool-amid-political-
changes-and-south
44 L. Jones, S. Hameiri, and Royal Institute of International Affairs, Debunking the Myth of “debt-trap Diplomacy”: How Recipient 
Countries Shape China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2020).
45 William Case, “Stress testing leadership in Malaysia: the 1MDB scandal and Najib Tun Razak,” Pacific Review 30, no. 5 (2017)..
46 ‘Selling the country to China? Debate spills into Malaysia’s election’, Reuters 27 April 2018,  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-election-china
47 Abdullah, “The Mahathir effect in Malaysia’s 2018 election: the role of credible personalities in regime transitions.”.
48 ‘Malaysia to cancel $20 billion China-backed rail project‘, Reuters 26 January 2019,  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-malaysia-idUSKCN1PK03P
49 ‘Malaysia seizes China Petroleum Pipeline’s RM1b funds’, Malaysian Reserve, 15 July 2019, Malaysia seizes China Petroleum 
Pipeline’s RM1b funds (themalaysianreserve.com)
50 ‘Malaysia renegotiated China-backed rail project to avoid $5bn fee’, Financial Times 15 April 2019, Malaysia renegotiated China-
backed rail project to avoid $5bn fee | Financial Times (ft.com)
51 ‘Malaysian backlash tests China’s Belt and Road ambitions’, Financial Times 
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as follows: “The government was faced with the choice to either renegotiate or pay termination costs of about 
RM21.78bn (US$5.3 billion), with nothing to show for it. As such, we chose to go back to the negotiation table 
and call for a more equitable deal.”52
Behind the walk-back were an anti-corruption investigation’s findings that CCCC’s provision of bridging 
loans to 1MDB at massively inflated prices was designed to cover up Razak’s theft from the sovereign fund.53 
The willingness of the Chinese SoE to engage in illicit conduct in collusion with the former Prime Minister 
pointed up the accusations of “crony capitalism” that had dogged Mahathir’s last years in office. In the end, 
the Chinese government agreed to reduce the original price of the East Coast Rail Link by a third and to 
expand the number of local suppliers to 40%, as well as to set up a 50-50 joint venture between CCCC and 
a Malaysian company to operate the railway after completion.54 CCCC was also obliged to return in full the 
initial advance payment by Razak’s government. As for the unfinished pipeline, its cancellation in August 
2018 was followed a year later by the Malaysian government’s unilateral seizure of US$243 million from 
CPBB’s local bank account. This brazen act effectively brought the pipeline saga to an end.
V. DJIBOUTI
China established diplomatic ties with Djibouti on 8 January 1979. Soon afterwards, the PRC financed 
a stadium (just as in Costa Rica) and a number of other projects, including a hospital and a series of other 
government edifices, including a cultural center promoting Chinese culture called “The People Palace”.55 
Djibouti  is located on the strategically important Gulf of Aden at the entrance of the Suez Canal, the principal 
ocean-bound conduit for shipping from Asia to Europe. The former French colony and small desert enclave, 
with no natural resources and a population of under a million inhabitants, has lain under the rule of President 
Ismael Omar Guellah since 1999. Leveraging its geographic position, its economy can depend on the income 
from leasing military bases to interested foreign governments: France, Japan, and the United States. Hoping 
to develop Djibouti into a major logistics and transhipment hub between Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, 
Guellah had established port facilities at Doraleh in 2008, jointly managed by Djibouti and DPWorld.56
Beijing has been anxious to find a basing arrangement in the Gulf of Aden since at least 2009, when it first 
deployed a naval task force to the region as part of an international effort to combat Somali piracy. A multi-
national naval operation led by Western governments, but inclusive of the Russian and Indian navies, had been 
assembled. With 12% of global trade annually passing through the Suez Canal en route to European markets, 
Beijing recognized its own vulnerability to trade disruptions by piracy and hostage-ransoming.57 Beijing joined 
the operation in late 2008, sending two frigates and a supply vessel; though unlike its naval counterparts, 
it notably conducted operations without the benefit of rest and rehabilitation or a refueling station.58 In an 
unusual display of candor, China’s Admiral Yin Zhou declared in 2009 that, to continue operations, his navy 
52 ‘Malaysia renegotiated China-backed rail project to avoid $5bn fee’, Financial Times 15 April 2019, Malaysia renegotiated China-
backed rail project to avoid $5bn fee | Financial Times (ft.com)
53 Shaomin Xu and Jiang Li, “The Emergence and Fallacy of “China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy” Narrative,” China international studies, no. 
2 (2020).
54 Jones, Hameiri, and Affairs, Debunking the Myth of “debt-trap Diplomacy”: How Recipient Countries Shape China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative.
55 B. Lintner, The Costliest Pearl: China’s Struggle for India’s Ocean (Hurst, 2019).
56 David Styan, “China’s Maritime Silk Road and Small States: Lessons from the Case of Djibouti,” The Journal of Contemporary China 
29, no. 122 (2020).
57 ‘Suez Canal blockages: 4 of the biggest trade chokepoints’, DW 27 March 2021,  
https://www.dw.com/en/suez-canal-blockage-4-of-the-biggest-trade-chokepoints/a-57020755
58 J. Henry and Institut français des relations internationales, China’s Military Deployments in the Gulf of Aden: Anti-piracy and Beyond 
(IFRI Center for Asian Studies, 2016).
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needed a basing arrangement in the region.59 Its evacuation of 571 Chinese nationals and 225 foreigners 
after armed conflict erupted in Yemen in March 2015 further underscored the vulnerability of Chinese firms 
and citizens to regional instability, but also its evolving mission in the wake of the diminishing local piracy.60  
China announced in May 2015 that it would build a ‘logistical support facility’, as it called the dual-use 
facilities, subsequently revealed to be a ten-year lease at US$20 million annually (as compared to the larger 
facility of the US, which pays US$60 million annually).61 This first-ever foreign base marked a signal departure 
from the Chinese military’s traditional position, signaling its commitment to assuming a global peace 
and security role. Situating it in a country with many foreign military bases was, as Styan points out, “less 
controversial internationally for China … [being] directly alongside other major powers”.62 Construction began 
in the town of Obock in November 2015 with facilities housing 400 personnel, reportedly then expanding to 
2000 combined naval, army and special forces personnel.63 Regular training exercises began, including joint 
training exercises with Italian and Spanish troops in conducting humanitarian missions. 
Complementing the military base was China ExIm Bank loan of US$3.5 billion to expand port facilities 
and to open an industrial park; long-standing development goals hoped to transform the country into the 
Singapore of the region.64 The construction of the Djibouti Industrial Free Trade Park, jointly managed by a 
subsidiary of China Merchant Group (CMG) and the government of Djibouti, was claimed by CMG’s president 
to be a major step toward the creation of a “new Shekou”, the tiny fishing village on Guangdong’s Pearl 
River Delta that was transformed into the manufacturing metropolis of Shenzhen supposedly by a Special 
Economic Zone.65 Completion of the electric railway from Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, to Djibouti’s 
port in 2018 promised a way into the regional interior and the booming Ethiopian economy.66 Ambitions within 
the Djiboutian government grew along with Doraleh, expanding to eight ports set up to handle containers, 
petroleum, animal livestock, agricultural products; while the port and industrial zone were supplemented by 
a logistics hub, business services, and housing development, all jointly managed by CMG and the Djibouti 
government. Notably, Djibouti had to litigate withdrawal from a longstanding agreement with DP World in 
order to clear the way for CMG to take the leading role in 2018.
The cascading number of Chinese loans was crucial to Djibouti’s development agenda, and after the IMF 
decided in 2013 to suspend negotiations with Djibouti due to its hefty debt portfolio, Beijing was the only 
alternative lender left.67 Unfortunately, Guellah’s government quickly accumulated more debt, with 77% of 
the total held by China. There was concern that, like Sri Lanka, which had to surrender its port to make up for 
debt defaults, it would be forced to hand over Doraleh to the Chinese. Nevertheless, despite some analysts 
sharply criticizing Djibouti’s increased dependency on Chinese finance68, Djibouti itself defended its actions. 
59 Chris Alden and Yixiao Zheng, “China’s Changing Role in Peace and Security in Africa,” in China and Africa: Building Peace and 
Security Cooperation on the Continent, ed. C. Alden, et al. (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
60 Jerome Henry (2016) ‘China’s Military Deployments in the Gulf of Aden: anti-piracy and beyond’, Asie Visions 89, Paris, IFRI, 
November, pp. 20-23.
61 Peter A. Dutton, Isaac B. Kardon, and Conor M. Kennedy, “China Maritime Report No. 6: Djibouti: China’s First Overseas Strategic 
Strongpoint” (2020); Styan, “China’s Maritime Silk Road and Small States: Lessons from the Case of Djibouti.”
62  “China’s Maritime Silk Road and Small States: Lessons from the Case of Djibouti,” 193.
63 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s Military Base in Djibouti: A Microcosm of China’s Growing Competition with the United States and 
New Bipolarity,” The Journal of contemporary China 29, no. 125 (2020).
64 Styan, “China’s Maritime Silk Road and Small States: Lessons from the Case of Djibouti,” 196.
65 Deng Yangzi, “CMG Wants to Make African Port of Djibouti ‘New Shekou’,” China Daily March 7, 2017,  
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2017-03/07/content_28455386
66 Styan, “China’s Maritime Silk Road and Small States: Lessons from the Case of Djibouti.”
67 Katrina Manson, ‘Jostling for Djibouti’, Financial Times 1 April 2016,  
https://www.ft.com/content/8c33eefc-f6c1-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132
68 Daniel Connolly, “The Rise of the Chinese Navy: A Tirpitzian Perspective of Sea Power and International Relations,” Pacific Focus 
32, no. 2 (2017). Ankit Panda ‘Chinese navy’s Djibouti base: a support facility or something more?’ The Diplomat February, 2017, 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/the-chinese-navys-djibouti-base-a-support-facility-or-someting-more/
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As Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf declared in an interview in 2016:
We don’t want the Americans to leave but the Chinese invest billions of dollars in 
our infrastructure; that’s what the Americans are not doing. So we are trying to 
keep the balance to see where our interest lies, as a small country with very limited 
resources.69
With little freight traffic on the US$4 billion Addis to Djibouti railway, however, and with the Ethiopian 
government searching for alternative rail and port routes, the port’s future viability was called into question by 
no less an authority than the Chinese insurance company on the project, Sinosure, which reportedly wrote off 
US$1 billion in losses.70 Even worse, a dispute arose between Djibouti and China Rail Construction Company 
(CRCC) over who was responsible for the costs of the last 100 kilometers of the electric railway, which was 
only settled by Djibouti conceding a large portion of its equity stake in the railway to the Chinese SoE.71 In 
the meantime, although the commercial case came under increasing scrutiny, the Chinese military continued 
to expand its existing naval facilities at Obock to accommodate an aircraft carrier and eventually submarine 
pens, as well as joint training capacity.72 
69 Katrina Manson, ‘Jostling for Djibouti’, Financial Times 1 April 2016,  
https://www.ft.com/content/8c33eefc-f6c1-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132
70 Botched Chinese railway project in Africa is a warning to belt and road investors | South China Morning Post (scmp.com); ‘Chinese 
investments in Africa go off the rails’, Financial Times,  
https://www.ft.com/content/82e77d8a-e716-11e8-8a85-04b8afea6ea3
71 Styan, “China’s Maritime Silk Road and Small States: Lessons from the Case of Djibouti,” 202.
72 Cabestan, “China’s Military Base in Djibouti: A Microcosm of China’s Growing Competition with the United States and New 
Bipolarity,” 146..
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VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
A key aspect in these case studies is the country’s main political and commercial actors. It must be 
remembered that the analysis seeks to determine advantages, disadvantages, and lessons to be learned 
from each country. There are remarkable similarities in how Beijing has dealt with these countries, particularly 
Djibouti and Costa Rica. Despite establishing diplomatic ties with Beijing thirty years apart, both countries 
profited from China’s “stadium diplomacy”, being gifted a football stadium after switching to Beijing. This 
suggests that China follows a similar modus operandi in dealing with smaller countries; both countries being 
the smallest in our sample. The same pattern did not obtain in the cases of Argentina and Malaysia, which are 
more comparable in terms of size and power. This suggests that Chinese foreign policy is bespoke for local 
appeal based on what people in these countries may see as a priority for their own development and self-
image. China’s foreign policy is highly appealing to these countries, particularly absent support and attention 
from the US and other Western powers. Beijing needs only to do marginally better than Western countries to 
politically leverage its commercial influence. This has allowed China to garner support for its Belt and Road 
Initiative from three of the countries studied, Argentina being the exception. This is key, as China sees it as 
an opportunity to expand its trade and influence in the global South (and all over the world) by reconstructing 
the fabled Silk Road as part of a grand strategy to expand its hard and soft power all over the world.73 One of 
the common denominators among these four countries was China’s desire to use trade as a tool to achieve 
political and diplomatic goals. These four countries were looking for trade opportunities and the West was 
nowhere to be found. This shows that China’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 was 
one of China’s most important achievements, as it has empowered Beijing to advance its agenda in the global 
South to an unprecedented degree. All of the countries in this study have important trade relationships with 
China, ranging from a free trade agreement with Costa Rica to a comprehensive strategic partnership with 
Argentina, to a free trade zone in Djibouti, to a free trade agreement with Malaysia via its FTA with ASEAN. 
COSTA RICA  
The lessons learned from Costa Rica and its relations with China indicate that Beijing sees as a positive 
aligning itself with countries that are perceived to be beacons of democracy in the international arena. The 
PRC is not always able to establish such cordial relations with other democratic regimes, but Costa Rica was 
willing to allow the relationship to grow in the way it did. Its Costa Rican diplomacy also indicates Beijing’s 
interest in being able to weaken Taiwan at will, as Central America is the region with the majority of countries 
that remain Taipei’s diplomatic allies—9 out of 15 at the time of writing.
China’s relationship with Costa Rica also indicates that Beijing is fully aware that free trade agreements 
and/or anything to do with free trade goes a long way toward achieving its foreign policy objectives in the 
global South. Having the third free trade agreement with China in Latin America is a source of pride for many 
in Costa Rica, particularly for those who achieved it. An FTA in the eyes of many leaders of the global South 
is a notable achievement in and of itself. This strategy was also used in Djibouti, where China opened an 
international free trade zone in 2018, which enables users to trade without paying several types of taxes. 
ARGENTINA
The case of Argentina illustrates Beijing’s ability to use trade as a tool to advance its political and economic 
interests with a country. Argentine politicians are also fascinated with anything to do with trade, particularly 
if they feel they are being given the status they deserve (despite their economy being a disaster for years). In 
2004 China realized this overriding motive of Argentine politicians and gave Argentina the title of “strategic 
partner”. Ten years later, Beijing again used titles as leverage and upgraded Argentina to a “comprehensive 
strategic partner”. This has allowed Beijing to enjoy a very profitable relationship with Argentina. As at 
73  Alvaro Mendez and Chris Alden, “China in Panama: From Peripheral Diplomacy to Grand Strategy,” Geopolitics 26, no. 3 (2021).
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2020 China had become Argentina’s largest trading partner, replacing Brazil which had occupied the rank 
for several years previous. Out of the 24 Latin American countries with diplomatic ties to Beijing, only 19 
have endorsed the BRI to date. Argentina, along with Colombia, Mexico, and the Bahamas, is one of the 
last remaining holdouts. Although there were rumors in mid-2020 that Argentina was going to sign an MoU 
with Beijing to that purpose, it has not done so yet. Beijing is aware of this and in January 2021 President Xi 
Jinping appealed to President Alberto Fernandez to do so. In his appeal he promised to deepen the current 
comprehensive strategic partnership. Fernandez promoted the importance of the BRI, but has yet to agree a 
formal endorsement. It is expected that Beijing will continue to bring up the issue over and over until Argentina 
acquiesces. Argentina might be playing hard to get as leverage to obtain a better deal from Beijing, but it is 
hard to tell whether or not this is so. One thing for sure is that Argentina has an interesting relationship that 
resembles Djibouti’s in going beyond trade to include security issues, as indicated by the Chinese military 
presence in Patagonia. 
MALAYSIA 
Malaysia offers a good example of how the astute exercise of local “agency” can bring about a revision of 
unfavorable deals negotiated with China, improving the terms for the recipient. Concurrently, it demonstrates 
the lack of transparency in dealings with China that complicates relations. Mahathir’s harsh criticism of China’s 
alleged “new version of colonialism” struck a nerve with other countries in the global South.74 More recently, 
Malaysian criticism of BRI projects as an instrument of debt-trap diplomacy also illustrates the strong agency 
emanating from Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia nevertheless remains deeply dependent on China, whether it likes it 
or not. In this case again, Beijing has used trade as an instrument to dominate the foreign policy agenda with 
its counterpart. As a founding member of ASEAN, Malaysia has effectively a free trade agreement with China 
via the FDA agreement signed in 2004 with ASEAN. This is very important for Malaysia because its economy 
depends on Chinese purchasing power. With a small domestic market, Malaysian entrepreneurs have to 
go beyond the borders to seek opportunities: China is “there to help”. This is an important similarity with 
Costa Rica.
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti gives insight into how a comprehensive approach to military base and port construction can 
bring opportunities for trade, while also drawing interest from other actors who are keen observers of China’s 
first military base overseas. Djibouti has demonstrated that despite its very small size, it has agency that 
can use to leverage regional economic power via its free trade zone, but also international strategic power 
via the military bases that it hosts and its geopolitically strategic position at the entrance to the Suez Canal. 
As mentioned above, it is noteworthy that Djibouti resembles Costa Rica in the way Beijing has dealt with it. 
“Stadium diplomacy” and other small infrastructure projects are a trademark of Beijing’s economic statecraft 
that elicits diplomatic support and a positive reputation with the locals. After establishing the naval base in 
Djibouti, which has been operational since 2017, China upgraded Djibouti to a “strategic partner” (the same 
status that it gave to Argentina). This language has gone a long way toward winning over politicians in Djibouti, 
whose support for the BRI has also been crucial, as it offers Beijing a well-placed strategic commercial hub 
near one of the world’s most important shipping lanes. This matters for Beijing as a “significant percentage 
of Beijing’s trade with the European Union, valued at over $1 billion a day, passes through the Gulf of Aden, 
and 40 percent of China’s total oil imports pass through the Indian Ocean. Djibouti controls access to both the 
Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, and links Europe, the Asia-Pacific, the Horn of Africa, and the Persian Gulf”.75   
74 ‘Mahathir warns of “new colonialism” during China visit’, Financial Times 20 August 2018,  
https://www.ft.com/content/7566599e-a443-11e8-8ecf-a7ae1beff35b
75 Mordechai Chaziza (2021). China Consolidates Its Commercial Foothold in Djibouti, The Diplomat,  
https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/china-consolidates-its-commercial-foothold-in-djibouti/
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